This article undertakes an exploration of Reinhart Koselleck’s ideas concerning historical knowledge and moral judgment. Koselleck’s position is exemplified by the maxim “knowing is better than knowing better,” declaimed throughout his career. I argue that Koselleck’s separation of knowledge and judgment was unstable, with the prescription to know repeatedly folded into the proscription against knowing better. This article begins with an analysis of Koselleck’s maxim and the underlying theoretical position that sustained it. I show how the separation resulted from Koselleck’s attempts to delegitimate utopian philosophies of history and to maintain a plurality of possible histories. I also demonstrate how Koselleck’s maxim reveals the centrality of philosophical-historical schemata in current debates about the meaning and utility of the past, and how recognizing the tension between knowledge and judgment can reshape concerns about history and moral judgment. Throughout, I illuminate how Koselleck’s knowledge/judgment problematic is germane to the philosophy of history by reading him alongside R.G. Collingwood and Joan Scott.

中文翻译：

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科塞莱克和历史判断问题

本文对莱因哈特·科塞莱克关于历史知识和道德判断的思想进行了探讨。科塞莱克的立场体现在他在整个职业生涯中所宣扬的格言“知胜于知”。我认为科塞莱克对知识和判断的分离是不稳定的，“了解”的处方反复被纳入反对“更好地了解”的禁令中。本文首先分析了科塞莱克的格言以及支持该格言的基本理论立场。我将展示科塞莱克试图取消乌托邦历史哲学的合法性并维持多种可能的历史，从而导致这种分离。我还展示了科塞莱克的格言如何揭示了哲学历史图式在当前有关过去的意义和效用的辩论中的中心地位，以及认识到知识与判断之间的紧张关系如何能够重塑对历史和道德判断的关注。在整个过程中，我通过与 RG Collingwood 和 Joan Scott 一起阅读科塞莱克的知识/判断问题如何与历史哲学密切相关。