How can we understand the phenomena of loss and mourning in the Heideggerian framework? There is no established interpretation of Heidegger that gives an elaborate account of the phenomena of loss and mourning, let alone gauges its importance for our understanding and assessment of authentic existence in Heidegger. This paper attempts to do both. First, I give a detailed exposition of Heidegger’s analysis of the phenomena of mourning and loss and show that Heidegger’s analysis of mourning in his early and late work is strikingly in line with his collectivist understanding of Being-with. This demonstrates, contrary to what some of his proponents argue, that Heidegger does not follow the kind of dynamic understanding of Being-with that places the other within fine-grained spaces of possibility. Second, with reference to Heidegger’s existential philosophy, I construct a phenomenology of mourning and grief. Though Heidegger himself fails to explain the relationships in which one mourns after a close other, we can develop a unique phenomenology of mourning with reference to Heidegger, which shows that each loss is singular and can be equiprimordial with one’s own death in opening one to the possibility of an authentic existence. In this new understanding of authenticity, loss is regarded as a powerful force, akin to death, in leading one toward their self-owned existence.

我们如何理解海德格尔框架中的失落和哀悼现象？对海德格尔没有既定的解释，可以对失落和哀悼现象进行详尽的解释，更不用说衡量它对我们理解和评估海德格尔的真实存在的重要性了。本文试图做到这两点。首先，我详细阐述了海德格尔对哀悼和失落现象的分析，并表明海德格尔在其早期和晚期作品中对哀悼的分析与他对共在的集体主义理解惊人地一致。这表明，与海德格尔的一些支持者所主张的相反，海德格尔并不遵循那种对“共在”的动态理解，这种理解将他人置于细粒度的可能性空间中。其次，参考海德格尔的存在主义哲学，构建哀悼和悲伤的现象学。尽管海德格尔本人未能解释一个人在亲密的另一个人之后哀悼的关系，但我们可以参考海德格尔发展出一种独特的哀悼现象学，它表明每一次损失都是单一的，并且可以与一个人自己的死亡同等地打开一个人的死亡。真实存在的可能性。在这种对真实性的新理解中，失去被视为一种类似于死亡的强大力量，可以引导人们走向自我存在。