Variation in assessor stringency in awarding benefits leaves applicants exposed to uninsured risk that could be systematic if discretion were exercised selectively. Using administrative data on disability insurance (DI) applications in the Netherlands, we show that even in one of the most rule-based DI programs, there is still between assessor variation in awards, and there is systematic variation in assessment across applicants. Discretion is exercised in favor of lower-wage applicants relatively more than it is used to benefit higher-wage applicants. This is evident indirectly from downward discontinuities in pre-disability wages just above benefit entitlement thresholds and directly from wage-related differences in the extent to which assessors intervene in the semi-automated calculation of earnings capacity. While lower-wage applicants benefit on average, they are exposed to greater risk from between assessor variation in the exercise of discretion. Rule-based disability evaluation can reduce, but not eliminate, between-applicant variation in awards.

中文翻译：

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有选择地行使伤残保险赔偿的自由裁量权

评估者在发放福利时的严格程度的变化使申请人面临未投保的风险，如果有选择地行使自由裁量权，这种风险可能是系统性的。使用荷兰残疾保险 (DI) 申请的管理数据，我们表明，即使在最基于规则的 DI 计划之一中，评估者之间的裁决仍然存在差异，并且申请人之间的评估也存在系统性差异。对低工资申请人的酌处权相对于对高工资申请人的好处更多。这可以间接地从伤残前工资略高于福利资格门槛的向下不连续性以及评估员干预收入能力半自动计算的程度方面与工资相关的差异直接看出。虽然工资较低的申请人平均受益，但他们因评估者在行使自由裁量权时的差异而面临更大的风险。基于规则的残疾评估可以减少但不能消除申请人之间的奖励差异。