Strawson's view on punishment has been either neglected or recoiled from in contemporary scholarship on ‘Freedom and Resentment’ (FR). Strawson's alleged retributivism has made his view suspect and troublesome. In this article, we first argue, against the mainstream, that the punishment passage is an indispensable part of the main argument in FR (section 1) and elucidate in what sense Strawson can be called ‘a retributivist’ (section 2). We then elaborate our own hypothesis of symbolic retribution to explain the continuum between moral reactive attitudes and punishment that Strawson only adumbrates (section 3). After this justification of the punitive response to wrongdoing, we compare and contrast our specific kind of retributivist hypothesis with other positions in the so-called ‘new retributivism’ (section 4). Our hypothesis differs from other subvarieties of expressive retributivism in putting centre stage the idea of punishment as taking up a reverential stance towards the victim.

斯特劳森关于惩罚的观点在当代“自由与怨恨”（FR）学术中要么被忽视，要么被回避。斯特劳森所谓的报应主义使他的观点变得可疑和麻烦。在本文中，我们首先反对主流观点，认为惩罚段落是FR主要论证中不可或缺的一部分（第1节），并阐明斯特劳森在什么意义上可以被称为“报应主义者”（第2节）。然后，我们详细阐述了我们自己的象征报应假设，以解释斯特劳森仅暗示的道德反应态度和惩罚之间的连续性（第 3 节）。在证明对不法行为的惩罚性反应的合理性之后，我们将我们特定类型的报应主义假设与所谓的“新报应主义”（第 4 节）中的其他立场进行比较和对比。我们的假设与表达性报应主义的其他分支不同，我们的假设将惩罚的理念置于中心位置，即对受害者采取崇敬的立场。