This paper shows that the provision of consumer rights can induce unintended distributional effects and may, under specific circumstances, even decrease welfare when some consumers are unaware of these rights. We find that consumers who are uninformed about a mandated warranty may demand excessively safe products when the share of informed consumers is high. In other circumstances, uninformed consumers buy the efficient or an inefficiently unsafe products like informed consumers, but the former cross-subsidize the latter via firms’ pricing. Concerning the salient policy option of improving information about consumer rights, we find that increasing the share of informed consumers may raise the risk of inefficiency.

中文翻译：

---

有关消费者权利的不完美信息：对效率和分配的影响

本文表明，提供消费者权利可能会引起意想不到的分配效应，并且在特定情况下，当一些消费者不知道这些权利时，甚至可能会减少福利。我们发现，当知情消费者的比例很高时，不了解强制保修的消费者可能会要求过度安全的产品。在其他情况下，不知情的消费者会像知情的消费者一样购买高效或低效的不安全产品，但前者通过企业定价对后者进行交叉补贴。关于改善消费者权利信息的重要政策选择，我们发现增加知情消费者的比例可能会增加效率低下的风险。