In this paper, we study a labor market setup in which workers exhibit relative remuneration concerns with respect to their peers. We first characterize the optimal labor contract offered by the firm and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the desirability of incorporating pay-secrecy clauses in such a contract. We then demonstrate that, in contrast to conventional wisdom viewing wage-secrecy arrangements as detrimental for workers, the latter may, in fact, gain from the lack of pay transparency.

中文翻译：

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薪酬保密案例

在本文中，我们研究了一种劳动力市场设置，其中工人表现出相对于同龄人的相对薪酬担忧。我们首先描述了企业提供的最优劳动合同，并为在此类合同中纳入薪酬保密条款的可取性提供了必要和充分的条件。然后我们证明，与认为工资保密安排对工人不利的传统观点相反，事实上，工人可能会从缺乏工资透明度中获益。