Legal procedures used to determine liability trade-off type-1 errors (e.g., false convictions) against type-2 errors (e.g., false acquittals). After noting that people’s relative preferences for type-1 errors (compared to type-2 errors) appear to be negatively correlated with technological advancements, we study how the accuracy of evidence collection methods may affect the trade-off between these two errors. Counter-intuitively, we find that under some conditions, greater accuracy may result in a higher probability of type-1 error (or type-2 error) maximizing deterrence. Then, assuming both errors are decreasing in accuracy, we characterize the type-1 error that emerges under electoral pressures (when the median voter’s preferences are implemented): convictions occur more often than is socially optimal but less often than is necessary to maximize deterrence. Moreover, as the harm from crime increases, the median voter becomes less tolerant of type-1 errors as the legal system’s accuracy increases. We also show that, because the median voter is less averse toward type-1 errors than the average citizen, an increase in accuracy may reduce welfare.

中文翻译：

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法律错误的准确性和偏好

用于确定第 1 类错误（例如错误定罪）与第 2 类错误（例如错误无罪释放）之间的责任权衡的法律程序。在注意到人们对 1 类错误（与 2 类错误相比）的相对偏好似乎与技术进步呈负相关之后，我们研究了证据收集方法的准确性如何影响这两种错误之间的权衡。与直觉相反，我们发现在某些条件下，更高的准确度可能会导致更高的 1 类错误（或 2 类错误）概率，从而最大化威慑力。然后，假设这两个错误的准确性都在下降，我们描述了在选举压力下出现的第一类错误（当中间选民的偏好得到实现时）：定罪发生的频率高于社会最优的频率，但低于最大化威慑所需的频率。此外，随着犯罪危害的增加，随着法律体系准确性的提高，中位选民对第一类错误的容忍度变得越来越低。我们还表明，由于中位选民比普通公民更不厌恶第一类错误，因此准确性的提高可能会减少福利。