Promoting public cooperation has become a challenge for authorities in the pandemic era. We develop a novel laboratory experiment that explores the coordination and voluntary cooperation problems under spatial risk externalities, where the effect of an agent's effort depends on the spatially weighted efforts of all local and global members. We show that tax-like centralized interventions are effective in improving collective-risk mitigation, social welfare, and equality among members. Then, our result illustrates that the effectiveness of revealing information about others’ behavior on risk mitigation depends on intervention degrees and whether mitigation choices are strategic complements or substitutes.

中文翻译：

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自愿合作减轻空间外部性下的集体风险

促进公共合作已成为疫情时代当局面临的挑战。我们开发了一项新颖的实验室实验，探索空间风险外部性下的协调和自愿合作问题，其中代理人努力的效果取决于所有本地和全球成员的空间加权努力。我们证明，类似税收的集中干预措施可以有效改善集体风险缓解、社会福利和成员之间的平等。然后，我们的结果表明，揭示他人行为信息对缓解风险的有效性取决于干预程度以及缓解选择是战略补充还是替代。