The Dodd–Fank Act mandated shareholder votes on executive's change-in-control (golden parachute) payments at the time the firm is sold. We study bid premiums surrounding the introduction of the vote and find that they are lower in the post-period. Moreover, there is a positive association between the relative size of parachute payments and premiums, particularly after the parachute vote was required. In contrast, we observe no association between premiums and parachute features questioned by many shareholders. Additionally, we find lower voting support for parachutes with features that are (i) of concern to shareholders, (ii) amended in the lead-up to the vote and (iii) identified as problematic in proxy advisor analyst reports. However, we find little evidence that directors overseeing payments with opposition from shareholders or a leading proxy advisor are penalized with lost board seats, fewer key board committee memberships or increased shareholder opposition in subsequent director elections at other firms. Overall, our findings suggest that the parachute vote requirement is too little too late.

中文翻译：

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股东对金色降落伞进行投票：有效治理还是太少太晚？

《多德-范克法案》强制股东在公司出售时就高管控制权变更（黄金降落伞）付款进行投票。我们研究了围绕投票引入的投标溢价，发现后期投标溢价较低。此外，降落伞付款的相对规模与保费之间存在正相关关系，特别是在需要降落伞投票之后。相比之下，我们观察到保费和许多股东质疑的降落伞功能之间没有关联。此外，我们发现，具有以下特征的降落伞的投票支持率较低：(i) 股东关心的特征；(ii) 在投票前进行修改；(iii) 在代理顾问分析师报告中被确定为有问题的特征。然而，我们发现几乎没有证据表明，在股东或主要代理顾问的反对下监督付款的董事会因失去董事会席位、减少关键董事会委员会成员或在其他公司随后的董事选举中增加股东反对而受到惩罚。总的来说，我们的研究结果表明，降落伞投票的要求太少，也太晚了。