In this article, we examine the economics of public consumer banking in the United States. Public expenditures on consumer banking can take the form of price subsidies or direct provision. The economic case for price subsidies is weak because the evidence suggests most unbanked consumers would prefer a cash grant. The economic case for public provision is also weak because the existing market failures in banking are better remedied by regulation. The exceptions to this rule are check cashing and related payment services, which could be supplied by the US Postal Service (USPS) at a lower cost than private providers. On the other hand, economic arguments for the superiority of cash transfers presume that the institutional infrastructure exists to deliver them. But an effective infrastructure for public transfers does not exist in the United States and is only possible with universal ownership of payment accounts, which in turn requires some form of public subsidy or provision. We suggest one path forward: expand the financial services currently offered to federal beneficiaries—such as Social Security recipients—by the Treasury.

中文翻译：

---

针对公共银行的经济案例及其案例

在本文中，我们研究了美国公共消费银行业务的经济学。消费银行业务的公共支出可以采取价格补贴或直接提供的形式。价格补贴的经济理由很薄弱，因为有证据表明大多数没有银行账户的消费者更喜欢现金补贴。公共供给的经济理由也很薄弱，因为银行业现有的市场失灵可以通过监管更好地补救。此规则的例外情况是支票兑现和相关支付服务，这些服务可以由美国邮政服务 (USPS) 以低于私人提供商的成本提供。另一方面，支持现金转移支付优越性的经济论据假定存在提供现金转移支付的制度基础设施。但美国不存在有效的公共转移基础设施，只有支付账户的普遍所有权才有可能实现，而这反过来又需要某种形式的公共补贴或规定。我们建议一条前进道路：扩大财政部目前向联邦受益人（例如社会保障受益人）提供的金融服务。