Existing predominant approaches within virtue ethics (VE) assume humans as the typical agent and virtues as dispositions that pertain primarily to human–human interpersonal relationships. Similarly, the main accounts in the more specific area of environmental virtue ethics (EVE) tend to support weak anthropocentric positions, in which virtues are understood as excellent dispositions of human agents. In addition, however, several EVE authors have also considered virtues that benefit non-human beings and entities (e.g., environmental or ecological virtues). The latter correspond to excellent character dispositions that would extend moral consideration and care for the benefit of non-human beings, entities, or entire ecosystems. In this direction, a few authors have argued that EVE could be considered non-anthropocentric insofar as it could: (a) promote non-human ends, well-being, and the flourishing of non-human beings and entities; (b) involve significant relations to non-humans. Drawing from different traditions, including ecofeminism and care ethics, we argue for a broader notion of self and a decentered notion of virtues. The broader notion of selfhood corresponds to the “ecological self”, one that can be enacted by both human and non-human beings, is embedded in a network of relations, and recognizes the more-than-human world as fundamental and yet indispensable otherness. We suggest that this broader notion of agency allows for an expansive understanding of virtues that includes a-moral functional ecological virtues, which can be exercised not only by humans but also by certain non-human beings. This alternative understanding of selfhood and ecological virtues within EVE could have several theoretical and practical implications, some of which may enable different types of agencies and transform collective action.

中文翻译：

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生态美德自我：迈向非人类中心的环境美德伦理？

美德伦理学（VE）中现有的主要方法假设人类是典型的主体，而美德是主要与人与人的人际关系有关的性格。同样，环境美德伦理学（EVE）这一更具体领域的主要论述倾向于支持较弱的人类中心主义立场，其中美德被理解为人类主体的优秀性格。然而，此外，一些《EVE》作者还考虑了有益于非人类和实体的美德（例如，环境或生态美德）。后者对应于优秀的品格气质，可以为非人类、实体或整个生态系统的利益提供道德考虑和关怀。在这个方向上，一些作者认为 EVE 可以被认为是非人类中心的，因为它可以：（a）促进非人类的目的、福祉以及非人类和实体的繁荣；(b) 涉及与非人类的重要关系。借鉴不同的传统，包括生态女性主义和关怀伦理学，我们主张更广泛的自我概念和去中心化的美德概念。更广泛的自我概念对应于“生态自我”，一种可以由人类和非人类制定的自我，嵌入关系网络中，并承认超越人类的世界是基本且不可或缺的他者性。我们认为，这种更广泛的代理概念可以对美德有更广泛的理解，其中包括非道德的功能性生态美德，这些美德不仅可以由人类行使，也可以由某些非人类行使。这种对 EVE 中的自我和生态美德的另一种理解可能具有多种理论和实践意义，其中一些可能会启用不同类型的机构并改变集体行动。