Government financing of charities influences their fundraising and private donations. To analyze competition between charities, we modify the model of fundraising introduced by Andreoni and Payne, where there are two groups of donors and two charities. We concentrate on warm-glow motivation for giving and highlight strategic interaction in the market for donations. The charities are output-maximizing, producing services with a purchased input and in-house managerial supervision. In the absence of public funding, fundraising by charities are strategic complement given fixed costs. We show that block grants can change the nature of the competition, making fundraising strategic substitutes if grants exceed fixed costs. A charity receiving a grant will optimally reduce its fundraising, but the level of service provision will also be affected by the fact that the competing charity will solicit more intensively. The competitor will deliver more services because it benefits from the reduction in solicitation by the grant recipient. In this setting, matching grants work much like block grants as charities in both cases will compete less intensively for donations. That is, incentives for fundraising are weaker with matching grants. However, if both instruments are used the impact of a matching grant depends on whether the block grant over- or undercompensates for fixed costs. An optimal funding policy must account for this interaction effect as well as the fungibility of support working through charity competition in the market for donations.

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慈善捐赠市场的战略互动：公共资金的作用

政府对慈善机构的资助会影响其筹款和私人捐赠。为了分析慈善机构之间的竞争，我们修改了安德烈奥尼和佩恩引入的筹款模型，其中有两组捐赠者和两个慈善机构。我们专注于温暖的捐赠动机，并强调捐赠市场的战略互动。这些慈善机构追求产出最大化，通过购买投入和内部管理监督来提供服务。在缺乏公共资金的情况下，鉴于固定成本，慈善机构筹款是战略补充。我们证明，整笔拨款可以改变竞争的性质，如果拨款超过固定成本，则可以成为筹款的战略替代品。接受赠款的慈善机构将最大限度地减少其筹款活动，但服务提供水平也会受到竞争慈善机构更密集地募集这一事实的影响。竞争对手将提供更多服务，因为它受益于赠款接受者招标的减少。在这种情况下，匹配赠款的工作方式与整笔赠款非常相似，因为在这两种情况下，慈善机构对捐赠的竞争都不会那么激烈。也就是说，配套赠款的筹款激励作用较弱。然而，如果同时使用这两种工具，配套赠款的影响取决于整笔赠款对固定成本的补偿是否过高或过低。最佳的资助政策必须考虑到这种互动效应以及通过捐赠市场上的慈善竞争提供支持的可替代性。