In this paper, we consider those voting situations in which each voter decides whether he or she approves each candidate. Given a list of such approvals, a “social preference function” picks a ranking of the candidates. We are interested in finding out which social preference functions are non-manipulable. We show that a particular social preference function, referred to as approval ranking, is more decisive than any other social preference functions satisfying completeness, neutrality, anonymity, and non-manipulability. In addition, we show that approval ranking is axiomatized by these four axioms and tie-breakability.

中文翻译：

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认可度排名的特征

在本文中，我们考虑每个选民决定是否批准每个候选人的投票情况。给定此类批准的列表，“社会偏好函数”就会选择候选人的排名。我们有兴趣找出哪些社会偏好函数是不可操纵的。我们证明，一种特定的社会偏好函数（称为支持排名）比任何其他满足完整性、中立性、匿名性和不可操纵性的社会偏好函数更具决定性。此外，我们表明支持排名是由这四个公理和平局打破性公理化的。