Abstract

We consider the problem of developing and optimizing the rules of the spectrum auction. One-sided sealed-bid spectrum auctions are studied. Two types of pricing are compared theoretically: the first-price and the second-price. А game model of the auction with free riders is constructed. A free rider uses frequencies purchased by another such participant for free. All Nash equilibria of the obtained games are found and represented in an analytical form. The significant difference between games with all free riders and games with at least one ordinary player is shown. It is proved that when players eliminate their dominated strategies, the resulting auction price of the lot is determined by its value for ordinary players. In the case when all players are free riders, the price is equal to the minimal bid price. The influence of the information the participants have about their partners’ values of a lot on the outcome of the game is discussed. The theoretically obtained properties are in agreement with the results of the experiments presented for spectrum auctions in the scientific literature.

中文翻译：

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频谱竞争分配的博弈论特异性

摘要

我们考虑制定和优化频谱拍卖规则的问题。研究了单边密封投标频谱拍卖。理论上比较了两种定价方式：第一价格和第二价格。构建了搭便车拍卖的博弈模型。搭便车者使用其他此类参与者免费购买的频率。找到所获得博弈的所有纳什均衡并以分析形式表示。显示了所有搭便车者的游戏和至少一名普通玩家的游戏之间的显着差异。事实证明，当玩家消除其占优策略时，拍品的拍卖价格由其对普通玩家的价值决定。在所有玩家都是搭便车的情况下，价格等于最低投标价。讨论了参与者所掌握的关于其伙伴价值观的信息对博弈结果的影响。理论上获得的特性与科学文献中频谱拍卖的实验结果一致。