The COVID-19 pandemic brought the debate about the ethics of metaphors to the fore. In this article, I draw on blending theory—a theory of cognition—and theories of epistemic injustice to explore both the epistemic and ethical implications of metaphors. Beginning with a discussion of the conceptual alterations that may result from the use of metaphors, I argue that the effects these alterations have on available hermeneutical resources have the potential to result in a type of hermeneutical injustice distinct from the “lacuna” described by Miranda Fricker (Fricker 2007). Following, I examine how metaphors may therefore be considered “ethically bad epistemic practice,” as described by Rebecca Mason, because of how they may contribute to perpetuating an inequitable epistemic status quo (Mason 2011). Yet these same features may be used to promote epistemic justice in the context of intersectional power relationships. Situating the effects of metaphors within an inequitable yet dynamic epistemic system, I argue that foregrounding intersectional power dynamics enables us to interrogate the ethics of metaphors with consideration of both the epistemic and material consequences that may occur. I conclude by providing guidance for how, given that metaphors do epistemic work, we may use them to do ethical epistemic work.

COVID-19 大流行将隐喻伦理学的争论带到了前台。在本文中，我利用混合理论（一种认知理论）和认知不公正理论来探讨隐喻的认知和伦理含义。首先讨论隐喻的使用可能导致的概念改变，我认为这些改变对可用解释学资源的影响有可能导致一种不同于米兰达·弗里克（Miranda Fricker）描述的“空白”的解释学不公正。 （弗里克，2007）。接下来，我研究了隐喻如何被视为“道德上不良的认知实践”，正如丽贝卡·梅森（Rebecca Mason）所描述的那样，因为它们可能有助于维持不公平的认知现状（Mason 2011）。然而，这些相同的特征可以用来在交叉权力关系的背景下促进认知正义。将隐喻的影响置于一个不公平但动态的认知系统中，我认为，前景交叉权力动态使我们能够在考虑可能发生的认知和物质后果的情况下质疑隐喻的伦理性。最后，我为我们如何使用隐喻进行认知工作提供指导，以进行伦理认知工作。