This research builds a three-stage (bundling, horizontally differentiated innovations [HDIs], and outputs) game in which only one multi-product firm undertakes a bundling strategy in order to analyze the impacts of bundling on HDIs and competes with a single-product firm. It is found that no matter what the degree of initial product substitution is, bundling will definitely amplify the degree of horizontal product differentiation. When the initial degree of product substitution is large, the bundling strategy subdues the firm's HDI while increasing the competitor's HDI. However, when the initial degree of product substitution is small, the bundling increases both firms' HDIs, resulting in higher competitor's profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare. An important policy implication of our results is that antitrust regulation that allows bundling may contribute to the multi-product firm's HDI.

中文翻译：

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捆绑和横向差异化创新

本研究构建了一个三阶段（捆绑、横向差异化创新 [HDI] 和产出）游戏，其中只有一家多产品公司采取捆绑策略，以分析捆绑对 HDIs 的影响并与单一产品竞争公司。研究发现，无论初始产品替代程度如何，捆绑销售肯定会放大横向产品差异化程度。当产品的初始替代程度较大时，捆绑策略会抑制公司的 HDI，同时增加竞争对手的 HDI。然而，当初始产品替代程度较小时，捆绑会增加两家公司的 HDI，从而导致竞争对手的利润、消费者剩余和社会福利更高。我们的结果的一个重要政策含义是，允许捆绑销售的反垄断监管可能有助于多产品公司的 HDI。