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The yardstick approach in a Tullock contest
Managerial and Decision Economics ( IF 1.379 ) Pub Date : 2024-01-16 , DOI: 10.1002/mde.4103
Yizhaq Minchuk 1
Affiliation  

A contest's organizational structure or mechanism is often determined by the organizer's goal. While most contest organizers are interested in maximizing the effort expended by the contestants, some are interested in maximizing social welfare. We examine the corresponding contest mechanisms using a Tullock contest (standard and winner-pay) combined with the yardstick approach, which in some cases can achieve both goals simultaneously. Two cases are considered. The first is the yardstick approach that takes the form of a payoff scheme in a standard Tullock contest where the contestants (winners or losers) are reimbursed according to the average effort of the other contestants. In the second, the yardstick approach is introduced into a winner-pay contest, in which the winner pays the average cost of the other contestants' efforts.

中文翻译:

塔洛克竞赛中的衡量标准

竞赛的组织结构或机制通常由组织者的目标决定。虽然大多数竞赛组织者都对参赛者付出的努力最大化感兴趣,但有些组织者对社会福利最大化感兴趣。我们使用塔洛克竞赛(标准竞赛和获胜者付费)结合尺度方法来研究相应的竞赛机制,在某些情况下可以同时实现这两个目标。考虑两种情况。第一种是标准方法,采用标准塔洛克竞赛中支付方案的形式,其中参赛者(获胜者或失败者)根据其他人的平均努力获得补偿参赛者。在第二种情况下,尺度方法被引入胜者付费竞赛中,其中胜者支付其他参赛者努力的平均成本。
更新日期:2024-01-16
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