This paper brings a systems engineering approach to policymaking in the context of violent radicalization. We test strategies to combat terrorism under the premise that violent radicalization is a complex system of social contagion resulting in terrorism. We built a simulation using DIME-PMESII military standards to replicate a terror contagion occurring over 10 years in both physical and online environments under optimal, realistic, and worst-case scenarios. We then tested antiterrorism, counterterrorism, and counter radicalization strategies as policy experiments in this simulation. These experiments identified four key dynamics relevant for developing policies to reduce terrorism. First, most well-known policies are ineffective in containing terrorism driven by social contagion. Second, strategies generating backlash can become worse than doing nothing at all. Third, perceived grievance determines the carrying capacity of terrorism in a system, allowing disrupted networks to regenerate. Fourth, variable public support may result in sharp secondary waves of violence under certain contingencies. Experimenting with our model, we explore effective ways to address the violent radicalization problem.

中文翻译：

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打击暴力激进化的系统创新：政策背景下的系统工程

本文为暴力激进化背景下的政策制定带来了系统工程方法。我们在以下前提下测试打击恐怖主义的战略：暴力激进化是导致恐怖主义的社会传染的复杂系统。我们使用 DIME-PMESII 军事标准构建了一个模拟，以在最佳、现实和最坏情况下在物理和在线环境中复制 10 年来发生的恐怖蔓延。然后我们在这个模拟中测试了反恐、反恐怖主义和反激进化策略作为政策实验。这些实验确定了与制定减少恐怖主义政策相关的四个关键动态。首先，大多数众所周知的政策在遏制社会蔓延驱动的恐怖主义方面是无效的。其次，引起强烈反对的策略可能比什么都不做更糟糕。第三，感知到的不满情绪决定了系统中恐怖主义的承载能力，从而使受损的网络得以再生。第四，在某些突发事件下，公众支持的变化可能会导致剧烈的次生暴力浪潮。通过对我们的模型进行试验，我们探索了解决暴力激进化问题的有效方法。