Accelerating development of China's marine economy has caused serious environmental damage. A monetary compensation system could be developed and implemented to enable marine development that is ecologically, economically and socially sustainable. It is of great theoretical and practical significance to clarify the contradictions and conflicts among various stakeholders in the implementation and formulation of a monetary compensation system for marine environment damage in the future. By constructing an evolutionary game model of “central government（CG）- local governments (LGs) - marine enterprises (MEs)”, this paper analyzes the key factors that affect the LGs supervision and the strategic choice of MEs under the implementation of monetary compensation standards by the CG. With the help of numerical simulations, the influence of the main parameters on the stability of the system was characterized using MATLAB software, and the mechanism of the monetary compensation system for marine environmental damage was analyzed. The main research results show that: (1) the marine environmental damage compensation system can effectively promote the use of MEs to actively pay monetary compensation to compensate for damage to the ocean in their own production activities, but there is a possibility of failure for LGs in the incentive effect of supervision strategies. (2) Levying fines to MEs can effectively promote the behavior of MEs to actively pay monetary compensation to compensate for the damage to the ocean caused by their own production activities. (3) The supervision cost of LGs will affect the implementation effect of the marine environmental damage compensation system, reduce the supervision cost of LGs, help to realize the formation of an ideal strategy for the marine environmental damage compensation system, and have a good incentive effect on marine environmental damage management. (4) Improving the fines of the LGs for non-supervision can effectively supervise the behavior of the LGs, strengthen their supervision, and ensure smooth implementation of the monetary compensation system for marine environmental damage. Through the analysis of the three-party evolutionary game, we can deeply understand the interests and behavioral motives of all parties and provide a scientific basis for the formulation and implementation of a monetary compensation system for marine environmental damage. At the same time, it helps promote cooperation and coordination among all parties and achieves a positive interaction between economic development and ecological environment protection.