This paper analyzes the conflict of interests between capitalists and workers concerning patent and monetary policy in a Schumpeterian growth model with cash-in-advance (CIA) constraints in the R&D sector, where capitalists own assets and workers supply labor. We find that (i) higher R&D productivity, lower CIA constraints, and a lower discount rate produce non-linear effects in the conflicts concerning the markup and the nominal interest rate, decreasing the former and increasing the latter in low-growth environments and having the opposite or no effects otherwise, (ii) the markup and the nominal interest rate have non-linear effects on the conflicts concerning the other similar to (i), (iii) considering less restrictive distributions of assets, labor supply, seigniorage revenues, monetary balances and financing of CIA constraints reduces, in general, the conflicts concerning the markup and interest rate. We conclude that policymakers will only be able to use patent and monetary policies to simultaneously promote economic growth and reduce the conflict of interest concerning the other if R&D productivity is sufficiently high. Otherwise, each policy can be used either to promote economic growth at the cost of exacerbating the conflicts of interest concerning the other or achieve the opposite effect.

本文分析了在研发部门存在预付现金（CIA）约束的熊彼特增长模型中，资本家和工人之间在专利和货币政策方面的利益冲突，其中资本家拥有资产，工人提供劳动力。我们发现，(i) 较高的研发生产率、​​较低的 CIA 约束和较低的贴现率会在加价和名义利率的冲突中产生非线性效应，在低增长环境中降低前者并增加后者，并且具有相反或没有影响，（ii）加价和名义利率对另一方的冲突具有非线性影响，类似于（i），（iii）考虑资产分配限制较少，劳动力供应，铸币税收入，中央情报局的货币余额和融资限制总体上减少了有关加价和利率的冲突。我们的结论是，只有研发生产率足够高，政策制定者才能够利用专利政策和货币政策来同时促进经济增长并减少彼此的利益冲突。否则，每一项政策都可能以加剧对方利益冲突为代价来促进经济增长，或者达到相反的效果。