This paper studies how minimum wages affect the wage distribution if firms face financial constraints. Using German employer-employee data and firm balance sheets, we document that the within-firm wage dispersion decreases more with higher minimum wages when firms are financially constrained. We introduce financial frictions into a search and matching labor market model with stochastic job matching, imperfect information, and endogenous effort. In line with the empirical literature, the model predicts that a higher minimum wage reduces hirings and separations. Firms become more selective such that their employment and wage dispersion fall. If effort increases strongly, firms may increase employment at the expense of higher wage dispersion. Financially constrained firms are more selective and reward effort less. As a result, within-firm wage dispersion and employment in these firms fall more with the minimum wage.

中文翻译：

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企业的最低工资、工资分散和财务约束

本文研究了如果企业面临财务约束，最低工资如何影响工资分配。使用德国雇主-雇员数据和公司资产负债表，我们发现，当公司财务紧张时，随着最低工资的提高，公司内部工资差距会进一步缩小。我们将金融摩擦引入到具有随机工作匹配、不完全信息和内生努力的搜索和匹配劳动力市场模型中。根据实证文献，该模型预测，较高的最低工资会减少招聘和离职。企业变得更加挑剔，从而导致就业和工资分散度下降。如果努力大幅增加，企业可能会以更高的工资分散度为代价来增加就业。财务受限的公司更有选择性，奖励努力的程度也更少。因此，企业内部的工资差距和这些企业的就业随着最低工资的下降而下降得更多。