This article addresses the exclusivism–inclusivism debate about religious reasons in law within a justificatory liberal framework. The question of whether religious reasons have justificatory capacity for attaining public justification has increasingly been seen as a matter of how public justification is understood between two rival models: the consensus model being aligned with exclusivism, the convergence model with inclusivism. More recently, however, that alignment has been challenged with attempts to show that consensus can reach an equivalent degree of inclusivism as convergence. Against this, I contend that the purported equivalence is misplaced. First, I identify a crucial ambiguity about public justification and two corresponding domains. Upon demonstrating these to be mutually independent and severable, I conclude that the moves to equalize the models are confined within the more narrow domain while, in the more fundamental domain, the choice of model continues to prove determinative as to the exclusivist or inclusivist valence of justificatory liberalism.

中文翻译：

---

宗教原因与自由主义合法性

本文讨论了在合理的自由主义框架内关于法律中的宗教原因的排他主义与包容主义的争论。宗教理由是否具有获得公共正当性的正当性能力的问题越来越被视为如何理解两种竞争模式之间的公共正当性的问题：共识模式与排他主义一致，融合模式与包容主义一致。然而，最近，这种一致性受到了挑战，人们试图证明共识可以达到与趋同同等程度的包容性。对此，我认为所谓的等价是错误的。首先，我发现了关于公共理由和两个相应领域的一个重要的模糊性。在证明这些是相互独立和可分割的之后，我得出的结论是，均衡模型的举措仅限于更狭窄的领域，而在更基本的领域，模型的选择继续证明对模型的排他主义或包容主义效价具有决定性作用。正当的自由主义。