Exploiting a unique hand-built dataset, belonging to non-financial firms, operating in an emerging economy, this study, first of its kind, reports that stock prices of firms with military-experienced board of directors reflect more firm specific information after controlling for board attributes, agent heterogeneity and firm level variation. The results robust to alternative specifications of informativeness and military director proxy support the notion that military-trained directors may enhance transparency in public listed companies and encourage the incorporation of more firm-specific information into stock prices. Further analysis suggests that military directors may enfeeble CEO–board nexus and settle the directional variations at the corporate board level: military directors bring discipline in the board room that translates into rigorous CEO monitoring and improved corporate governance quality.

这项研究首次利用了一个独特的手工构建的数据集，该数据集属于在新兴经济体运营的非金融公司，报告称，在控制了董事会属性、代理人异质性和公司级别差异。对信息性和军事董事代理的替代规范的稳健结果支持这样一种观点，即受过军事训练的董事可以提高上市公司的透明度，并鼓励将更多公司特定信息纳入股票价格。进一步的分析表明，军事董事可能会削弱首席执行官与董事会的关系，并解决公司董事会层面的方向性差异：军事董事在董事会中带来纪律，从而转化为严格的首席执行官监督并提高公司治理质量。