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Dominated choices under deferred acceptance mechanism: The effect of admission selectivity
Games and Economic Behavior ( IF 1.265 ) Pub Date : 2024-01-17 , DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.01.002
Ran I. Shorrer , Sándor Sóvágó

College applicants often make dominated choices even when a strategically simple mechanism such as deferred acceptance is in place. We study Hungarian college admissions, where deferred acceptance is used, and still many college applicants make revealed dominated choices: they forgo the free opportunity to receive a tuition waiver. Using two empirical strategies, we show that when admission with a tuition waiver becomes more selective, applicants make more revealed dominated choices. Our results suggest that dominated choices respond to economic incentives.

中文翻译:

延期录取机制下的主导选择:录取选择性的影响

即使采用了延迟录取等策略上简单的机制,大学申请者也常常会做出主导选择。我们研究了采用延期录取的匈牙利大学招生,仍然有许多大学申请者做出了显性主导选择:他们放弃了获得学费减免的免费机会。使用两种实证策略,我们表明,当学费减免入学变得更具选择性时,申请人会做出更多显性主导选择。我们的结果表明,主导选择会对经济激励做出反应。
更新日期:2024-01-17
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