This paper analyzes cooperation between governments to set up a public firm and decide what percentage of that firm each of them owns. A symmetric model is assumed, with two countries and one domestic private firm in each country. Firms produce a homogeneous good and have quadratic cost functions. The counterintuitive result emerges that there are two equilibria, in each of which one government has a higher percentage of ownership in the public firm than the other. We extend the analysis to consider other factors that may influence the distribution of ownership of the firm between the countries: Heterogeneous goods, constant marginal cost of production, inequality in the number of private firms existing in each country, and different numbers of consumers in each country.

本文分析了政府之间为建立上市公司而进行的合作，并决定了政府各自拥有该公司的比例。假设采用对称模型，其中有两个国家，每个国家有一家国内私营公司。企业生产同质商品并具有二次成本函数。违反直觉的结果出现了，存在两种均衡，在每种均衡中，一国政府在上市公司中的所有权比例高于另一国政府。我们将分析扩展到考虑可能影响国家之间企业所有权分配的其他因素：异质性商品、恒定的边际生产成本、每个国家现有私营企业数量的不平等以及每个国家不同数量的消费者国家。