This paper analyzes the impact of technology transfer on managerial delegation contracts. Under price competition, if technology transfer occurs, it increases the level of managerial delegation of a firm producing low-quality product. When the degree of technology transfer is relatively high, technology transfer improves the managerial delegation of producing high-quality products. When the degree of technology transfer is relatively low, technology transfer reduces the managerial delegation of firms producing high-quality products. Under quantity competition, technology transfer reduces the managerial delegation coefficient of all firms. We further analyze the Stackelberg competition and the royalty situation.

中文翻译：

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垂直产品差异化下技术转移对管理授权的影响

本文分析了技术转让对管理委托契约的影响。在价格竞争下，如果发生技术转让，就会增加生产低质量产品的企业的管理授权水平。当技术转让程度较高时，技术转让提高了生产高质量产品的管理授权。当技术转让程度较低时，技术转让会减少生产高质量产品的企业的管理授权。在数量竞争下，技术转让降低了所有企业的管理授权系数。我们进一步分析Stackelberg竞争和特许权使用费情况。