Appeals to the moral value of nature and naturalness are commonly used in debates about technology and the environment and to inform our approach to the ethics of technology and the environment more generally. In this paper, I will argue, firstly, that arguments from nature, as they are used in debates about new technologies and about the environment, are misinterpreted when they are understood as attempting to put forward categorical objections to certain human activities and, consequently, their real significance is often overlooked. Secondly, arguments from nature, particularly as they are used in the context of debates over the use of new technologies, can be understood as appealing to human nature as a way to determine human limitations. Thirdly, arguments from nature can inform our discussion of what it is to be a human being or a person, and this kind of discussion can, in turn, inform our ethical deliberations in such areas of bioethics as euthanasia, abortion, etc. Finally, I conclude that a proper understanding of these arguments can help in establishing which virtues and which vices relate to our relationship with the non-human world—that is, which character dispositions are relevant to an environmental virtue ethics, with human nature as its foundation. A proper understanding of the argument from nature provides the basis for a ‘virtuously anthropocentric’ environmental ethics.

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人类与环境“自然之论”的美德伦理解释

对自然和自然性的道德价值的诉求通常用于有关技术和环境的辩论中，并为我们更广泛地对待技术和环境伦理学的方法提供信息。在本文中，我将首先指出，来自自然的论点，当它们被用于关于新技术和环境的辩论时，当它们被理解为试图对某些人类活动提出明确的反对意见时，就会被误解，因此，它们的真正意义常常被忽视。其次，来自自然的论据，特别是当它们被用在有关新技术使用的辩论中时，可以被理解为诉诸人性，作为确定人类局限性的一种方式。第三，来自自然的论证可以为我们关于什么是人类或一个人的讨论提供信息，而这种讨论反过来又可以为我们在安乐死、堕胎等生物伦理学领域的伦理审议提供信息。最后，我的结论是，正确理解这些论点有助于确定哪些美德和哪些恶行与我们与非人类世界的关系有关，也就是说，哪些性格倾向与以人性为基础的环境美德伦理相关。对自然论证的正确理解为“道德上以人类为中心”的环境伦理学奠定了基础。