I study a strategic disclosure model wherein an uninformed decision-maker (DM) consults an expert of uncertain types regarding the state before acting. The expert may be an honest type, who is committed to reporting the truth; or a strategic type, whose payoff increases in the DM’s action independent of the state and, thus, strategically discloses information to facilitate his agenda while also valuing a reputation for honesty. We find that if the expert fails to obtain information with positive probability, a monotone equilibrium exists that involves an interval wherein the strategic expert adopts a mixed strategy for disclosure, in contrast to a simple cutoff rule that cannot be sustained in equilibrium. The value that the strategic expert attaches to reputation serves as a commitment device to promote disclosure, as does the higher probability that the state is observed, whereas an honest expert’s greater presence may harm the strategic expert’s disclosure incentive.

中文翻译：

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战略披露与声誉问题

我研究了一种战略披露模型，其中不知情的决策者 (DM) 在采取行动之前咨询了有关状态的不确定类型的专家。专家可能是诚实的类型，致力于报告真相；或者是战略型，其回报随着DM独立于国家的行动而增加，因此，战略性地披露信息以促进其议程，同时也重视诚实的声誉。我们发现，如果专家未能以正概率获得信息，则存在单调均衡，其中涉及策略专家采用混合策略进行披露的区间，这与无法维持均衡的简单截止规则相反。战略专家对声誉的重视可以作为促进披露的承诺手段，观察国家的可能性也更高，而诚实的专家的更多存在可能会损害战略专家的披露动机。