We address the problem of clearing mutual obligations among agents when a financial network collapses. To do so, we adopt an axiomatic approach and provide the first comprehensive characterization of the rules based on the principle of proportionality, covering the entire domain of financial systems. While a previous attempt by tackled this issue in a context where agents have strictly positive initial endowments, we show that their properties do not fully capture the set of proportional rules when extended to the full financial systems’ domain. To overcome this limitation, we introduce new properties that emphasize the value of equity of the firms in the network. We show that a clearing mechanism satisfies compatibility, limited liability, absolute priority, equity continuity, and non-manipulability by clones if and only if each agent receives a payment proportional to the value of their claims. This characterization holds in the framework studied by .

中文翻译：

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金融体系中的比例清算机制：公理化方法

我们解决当金融网络崩溃时清算代理人之间相互义务的问题。为此，我们采用公理化方法，并基于比例原则首次全面描述规则，涵盖金融体系的整个领域。虽然之前的尝试是在代理人具有严格的正初始禀赋的情况下解决这个问题，但我们表明，当扩展到整个金融系统领域时，他们的属性并不能完全捕获比例规则集。为了克服这一限制，我们引入了新的属性，强调网络中公司的股权价值。我们证明，当且仅当每个代理收到与其索赔价值成比例的付款时，清算机制才能满足兼容性、有限责任、绝对优先权、股权连续性和克隆的不可操纵性。这种特征在 所研究的框架中成立。