Greenwashing behaviors (GWBs) in green finance products (GFPs) by enterprises seriously hinder the realization of environmental protection goals. However, methods for effectively regulating GWBs in GFPs are unclear. This study constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze the formation and governance mechanisms of GWBs in GFPs among regulatory authorities, enterprises, and investors. Subsequently, the stability equilibrium strategy and key factors influencing the system equilibrium were discussed. Several interesting conclusions were drawn. First, we demonstrated that an interdependence mechanism exists among three game agents who mutually influence each other. The larger the probability of regulatory authorities choosing active supervision and investors adopting feedback, the more enterprises are willing to carry out green projects. Second, three corresponding governance modes for GWBs were put forward following the developmental stages of GFPs. Among these, the collaboration mode is the most effective in incentivizing enterprises to implement green projects. Third, based on sensitivity simulations, the initial willingness of the tripartite stakeholders, investor feedback cost, investor compensation, the penalty for greenwashing enterprises, and the reputational benefit of enterprises are critical factors that influence evolutionary results. Finally, targeted countermeasures were provided for regulatory authorities to prevent enterprises from engaging in GWBs.

中文翻译：

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如何治理绿色金融产品中的洗绿行为：三方进化博弈方法

企业绿色金融产品（GFP）的洗绿行为（GWB）严重阻碍环保目标的实现。然而，有效调控 GFP 中 GWB 的方法尚不清楚。本研究构建了三方演化博弈模型，分析了监管机构、企业和投资者之间GWB的形成和治理机制。随后，讨论了稳定均衡策略和影响系统均衡的关键因素。得出了几个有趣的结论。首先，我们证明了相互影响的三个博弈主体之间存在相互依赖机制。监管部门选择主动监管、投资者采取反馈的概率越大，企业就越愿意开展绿色项目。其次，根据GFP的发展阶段，提出了三种相应的GWB治理模式。其中，协作模式对于激励企业实施绿色项目最为有效。第三，根据敏感性模拟，三方利益相关者的初始意愿、投资者反馈成本、投资者补偿、洗绿企业惩罚以及企业声誉收益是影响演化结果的关键因素。最后，为监管部门提供了针对性的应对措施，以防止企业参与GWB。