The topic of the present reflection is Christian religious belief. Specifically, we will use Husserlian tools in order to examine the positional nature of this particular type of belief. We will be less interested in the question concerning the success conditions of this experience and more in its noetic structure. According to our proposal, to believe by faith supposes (although it is not exhausted by) accepting the existence of mundane evidence speaking against this fundamental belief. The believer acknowledges the existence of this contradicting en-doxical basis and nevertheless believes what she believes. We will refer to this simultaneous movement of accepting and cancelling as the concessive structure of the religious attitude. The para-doxical movement of experiencing conflicting evidence as being subjectively ineffective is a key component of this attitude. At least some inchoative conflict with the world is required in order for the religious belief to be religious. Lastly, we will try to show that, with a distinctive terminology, the idea that the Christian religious attitude involves a conflict between subjectivity and world is present not only in Kierkegaard but also in phenomenological figures like Scheler and even Husserl.

本次反思的主题是基督教的宗教信仰。具体来说，我们将使用胡塞尔工具来检验这种特定类型信念的位置性质。我们对这种经验的成功条件的问题不太感兴趣，而对它的意念结构更感兴趣。根据我们的建议，凭信心相信就意味着（尽管并没有穷尽）接受反对这一基本信念的世俗证据的存在。信徒承认这种相互矛盾的信仰基础的存在，但仍然相信她所相信的。我们将这种接受和取消的同时运动称为宗教态度的让步结构。将相互矛盾的证据视为主观无效的矛盾运动是这种态度的关键组成部分。为了使宗教信仰具有宗教性，至少需要与世界发生一些初始冲突。最后，我们将试图用一种独特的术语来表明，基督教的宗教态度涉及主体性与世界之间的冲突这一观点不仅存在于克尔凯郭尔，而且存在于像舍勒甚至胡塞尔这样的现象学人物中。