This paper studies side activities, including political activities, in the context of a hidden action agency problem. Given increases in the number of employees working from home and increases in managerial political engagement, such activities have become more prevalent. We examine the impact of these activities on the optimal contact, the agent’s welfare, the firm’s profit, and total welfare. For the case of political activities, we study the impact of external negative and positive feedback as the result of these activities on the optimal contract and all equilibrium variables. We ask whether the firm should encourage or discourage these activities.

中文翻译：

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机构框架中的政治和非政治活动

本文研究了隐性行动代理问题背景下的副业活动，包括政治活动。鉴于在家工作的员工数量增加以及管理人员政治参与的增加，此类活动变得更加普遍。我们研究这些活动对最佳接触、代理人福利、公司利润和总福利的影响。对于政治活动的情况，我们研究这些活动导致的外部负反馈和正反馈对最优契约和所有均衡变量的影响。我们询问公司是否应该鼓励或阻止这些活动。