This paper incorporates a risk-neutral principal-agent problem into a random search model to study contracting and search in general equilibrium. I introduce heterogeneity in principals' and agents' production technologies in terms of the distribution of output across states of nature. Under optimal contracting, this heterogeneity can give rise to complementarity in contracting between specific principal and agent types. In contrast to complementarity in production, complementarity in contracting affects only the division of the surplus but not its size and can induce principals to engage in overly intense search before forming a match. I show that a reduction in search frictions and contractual innovations can induce principals to engage in overly intense search.

中文翻译：

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与异构委托人和代理人签订合同和搜索

本文将风险中性委托代理问题纳入随机搜索模型中，研究一般均衡下的契约和搜索。我从不同自然状态的产出分布角度引入了委托人和代理人生产技术的异质性。在最优契约下，这种异质性可以导致特定委托人和代理人类型之间契约的互补性。与生产上的互补性不同，承包上的互补性只影响剩余的分配，而不影响剩余的规模，并且会导致委托人在形成匹配之前进行过度激烈的搜索。我表明，减少搜索摩擦和合同创新可能会导致委托人进行过度激烈的搜索。