In an industry with homogeneous goods, this note compares the standard incumbent's strategic capacity choice versus the incumbent's pre-emptive payment (profit) transfer (PPT) strategy (i.e., pre-entry acquisition). It is shown that via the transfer option, the incumbent holds its monopoly position “dissuading” the potential competitor entry for a range of fixed costs larger than under strategic capacity. Moreover, in that range, at least one firm is better off under PPT, while the other is indifferent between PPT and capacity choice. That is, in contestable markets, the incumbent can keep its dominant position in an easier way than standard models predict.

中文翻译：

---

阻止进入理论

在产品同质化的行业中，本文比较了标准现有企业的战略能力选择与现有企业的先发制人支付（利润）转移（PPT）策略（即进入前收购）。结果表明，通过转移选择，现有企业保持其垄断地位，以一系列高于战略能力的固定成本“阻止”潜在竞争对手进入。此外，在该范围内，至少有一家公司在 PPT 下状况较好，而另一家公司在 PPT 和产能选择之间无差异。也就是说，在可竞争的市场中，现有企业可以比标准模型预测的更容易的方式保持其主导地位。