The capabilities approach is the theory according to which, in order to assess people's quality of life and reflect on the basic political entitlements, we should consider what people are capable of doing and being. Focusing mostly on Nussbaum's account, a number of scholars analysed the metaethical structure underlying the approach, showing her Aristotelian and Kantian sources. This article explores another aspect of Nussbaum's theory which has so far been somewhat overlooked: the role of emotions in the justification and motivational support of the approach. After showing the importance Nussbaum places on compassion (and other benevolent emotions) to warrant her moral theory, I argue that – assuming her own cognitive account of compassion – her argument begs the question. I will then contend that Nussbaum's case does not have the inner tools to overcome such a circularity, trying to suggest, in conclusion, a possible way out which is consistent with it.

能力方法是一种理论，根据该理论，为了评估人们的生活质量并反思基本政治权利，我们应该考虑人们有能力做什么和成为什么。许多学者主要关注努斯鲍姆的叙述，分析了该方法背后的元伦理结构，展示了她的亚里士多德和康德渊源。本文探讨了努斯鲍姆理论的另一个方面，这一方面迄今为止一直被忽视：情感在该方法的论证和动机支持中的作用。在展示了努斯鲍姆对同情心（和其他仁慈情感）的重视以保证她的道德理论之后，我认为——假设她自己对同情心的认知解释——她的论点回避了这个问题。然后，我将主张努斯鲍姆的案例没有克服这种循环的内在工具，并试图在结论中提出与其一致的可能出路。