An optimization model is necessary to depict and induce the volatility and irregularity of manufacturing technology standard (MTS) diffusion processes to ensure that the standard can be widely adopted by related stakeholders in host countries. This paper clarifies the two-sided network coordination of MTS's transactional diffusion, consisting of new product diffusion among users and new technology diffusion among local suppliers. A procurement contract is introduced to connect and coordinate the two-sided networks. The manufacturer from the home country is responsible for the contract design, which aims to maximize its net revenue by considering the product diffusion processes. Local suppliers determine whether to accept the contract. The decision-making objectives of the contract acceptance for each local supplier are to maximize the net revenue and minimize workload fluctuation. The new standard-based products are produced and sold by the manufacturer. The corresponding local supplier adopts new standard-based technologies and supplies components for final product production if a contract is accepted. Therefore, a one-leader and multiple-follower Stackelberg game is proposed to figure out the best solution after coordinating the multiple objectives of each participant. The contract design and the contract acceptance are the leader and the follower, respectively. Analytical solutions under a specific MTS for refrigerator production are developed incorporating a nested Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm-II. The results demonstrate that the proposed method can efficiently coordinate the two-sided networks of MTS diffusion and balance the net revenue of all related stakeholders.

中文翻译：

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制造技术标准从母国向东道国传播的双边网络协调：具有多个目标的单领导者和多追随者Stackelberg博弈

需要一个优化模型来描述和诱导制造技术标准（MTS）扩散过程的波动性和不规则性，以确保该标准能够被东道国相关利益相关者广泛采用。本文阐明了MTS交易扩散的双向网络协调，包括用户之间的新产品扩散和本地供应商之间的新技术扩散。引入采购合同来连接和协调双方网络。来自本国的制造商负责合同设计，其目的是通过考虑产品扩散过程来最大化其净收入。当地供应商决定是否接受合同。每个本地供应商的合同接受的决策目标是最大化净收入和最小化工作量波动。基于新标准的产品由制造商生产和销售。如果合同被接受，相应的当地供应商将采用新的基于标准的技术，并为最终产品生产提供组件。因此，提出了一种单领导者和多追随者的Stackelberg博弈，以在协调每个参与者的多个目标后找出最佳解决方案。合同设计和合同验收分别是主导者和跟随者。结合嵌套非支配排序遗传算法-II，开发了用于冰箱生产的特定 MTS 下的分析解决方案。结果表明，所提出的方法可以有效协调 MTS 扩散的两侧网络并平衡所有相关利益相关者的净收入。