Patient-generated health data (PGHD) have great potential to improve clinical outcomes. As providers consider whether and how to incorporate PGHD into their clinical workflows, platforms by Apple and Amazon stand to fundamentally alter the landscape. With the aim to examine the conditions under which providers would adopt PGHD and possibly sign on with a platform, we analyzed the incentives and optimal strategies of two healthcare providers, a monopoly platform, and consumers using stylized game-theoretic models and solve for potential equilibria. We found that consumer surplus always increased with PGHD adoption, but social welfare may drop. The larger provider had more incentive to adopt PGHD than the smaller provider, but these incentives were reversed in the case of platform adoption. Accordingly, the platform enrolled the smaller provider first and possibly both providers. The emergence of the platform raised provider surplus, potentially at the expense of the consumers, despite offering its service to them for free. These results illustrate the importance of economic incentives regarding whether and how PGHD could be incorporated into our current healthcare system.

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采用患者生成的健康数据的博弈论分析

患者生成的健康数据 (PGHD) 在改善临床结果方面具有巨大潜力。当提供商考虑是否以及如何将 PGHD 纳入其临床工作流程时，苹果和亚马逊的平台将从根本上改变这一格局。为了研究提供商采用 PGHD 并可能与平台签约的条件，我们使用程式化博弈论模型分析了两家医疗保健提供商、一个垄断平台和消费者的激励和最优策略，并解决了潜在的均衡问题。我们发现，消费者剩余总是随着 PGHD 的采用而增加，但社会福利可能会下降。较大的提供商比较小的提供商更有动力采用 PGHD，但在采用平台的情况下，这些激励措施却相反。因此，该平台首先注册较小的提供商，并且可能同时注册两个提供商。该平台的出现提高了提供商的盈余，尽管免费向消费者提供服务，但可能会损害消费者的利益。这些结果说明了经济激励对于是否以及如何将 PGHD 纳入我们当前的医疗保健系统的重要性。