This article examines how a non-anthropocentric virtue ethics can truly avoid an anthropocentric bias in the ethical evaluation of a situation where the environment is at stake. It argues that a non-anthropocentric virtue ethics capable of avoiding the pitfall of an anthropocentric bias can only conceive of the ultimate good—from which virtues are defined—in reference to an ecological self. Such a self implies that the natural environment is not simply a condition for human flourishing, or something that complements it by adding the proper good of animals, organisms or ecosystems. Fulfilment is not that of a human self, but that of an ecological self: the natural environment or nature is not an external but an internal good. Therefore, the virtues or character traits that such an ecological self must nurture and develop leads us ultimately to distinguish—without opposing them—three different forms of virtue ethics applied to the environment, depending on whether it is anthropocentric or non-anthropocentric and whether nature is considered extrinsically or intrinsically. Such distinctions are also crucial to determine how we conceive of the political community and the collective goals that virtuous citizens assign to it (for instance, to preserve biodiversity, to tackle climate change, and so on).

中文翻译：

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美德伦理与生态自我：从环境美德到生态美德

本文探讨了非人类中心美德伦理如何在环境受到威胁的情况下进行伦理评估时真正避免人类中心偏见。它认为，能够避免人类中心偏见陷阱的非人类中心美德伦理学只能根据生态自我来构想最终的善——美德是由此定义的。这样的自我意味着自然环境不仅仅是人类繁荣的条件，也不仅仅是通过添加动物、有机体或生态系统的适当利益来补充人类繁荣的条件。实现不是人类自我的实现，而是生态自我的实现：自然环境或自然不是外在的善，而是内在的善。因此，这种生态自我必须培育和发展的美德或性格特征使我们最终区分（而不反对它们）适用于环境的三种不同形式的美德伦理，这取决于它是人类中心还是非人类中心以及自然是否被认为是外在的或内在的。这些区别对于决定我们如何构想政治共同体以及有道德的公民赋予政治共同体的集体目标（例如，保护生物多样性、应对气候变化等）也至关重要。