In 2017, Michael Nair-Collins formulated his Transitivity Argument which claimed that brain-dead patients are alive according to a concept that defines death in terms of the loss of moral status. This article challenges Nair-Collins’ view in three steps. First, I elaborate on the concept of moral status, claiming that to understand this notion appropriately, one must grasp the distinction between direct and indirect duties. Second, I argue that his understanding of moral status implicit in the Transitivity Argument is faulty since it is not based on a distinction between direct and indirect duties. Third, I show how this flaw in Nair-Collins’ argument is grounded in the more general problems between preference utilitarianism and desire fulfillment theory. Finally, I present the constructivist theory of moral status and the associated moral concept of death and explain how this concept challenges the Transitivity Argument. According to my view, brain death constitutes a valid criterion of death since brain death is incompatible with the preserved capacity to have affective attitudes and to value anything.

2017 年，迈克尔·奈尔·柯林斯 (Michael Nair-Collins) 提出了他的及物性论证，声称脑死亡患者根据道德地位丧失定义死亡的概念还活着。本文分三步挑战奈尔·柯林斯的观点。首先，我阐述了道德地位的概念，认为要正确理解这一概念，必须把握直接义务和间接义务的区别。其次，我认为他对传递性论证中隐含的道德地位的理解是错误的，因为它不是基于直接义务和间接义务之间的区别。第三，我将展示奈尔-柯林斯论证中的这一缺陷是如何植根于偏好功利主义和欲望满足理论之间更普遍的问题的。最后，我提出了道德地位的建构主义理论和相关的死亡道德概念，并解释了这个概念如何挑战传递性论证。根据我的观点，脑死亡构成了死亡的有效标准，因为脑死亡与保留的情感态度和重视任何事物的能力不相容。