In this article, I will argue that various scholars of kalām unanimously agree that sense-perception is something beyond the physical processes in the sense organs. There may be something happening in our eyes when we see a red apple, but seeing a red apple is not tantamount to it. We will see that some scholars of kalām argue that sense-perception is akin to being aware or conscious of the object of perception, and, hence, distinct from the physical process in the sense organs. One group will go so far as to accept that sense-perception is not even dependent on any physical processes in the body. Another group will accept that sense-perception presupposes that various physical conditions obtain, yet still regard sense-perception as something distinct from the occurrence of those conditions. I am suggesting that these nonreductive theories of sense-perception are the reason why Arabic-Islamic philosophers, starting from the eleventh century CE, consistently reject the Aristotelian-Avicennian theory of sense-perception.

中文翻译：

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卡拉姆哲学中感官知觉的非还原理论

在这篇文章中，我将论证卡拉姆的各个学者一致认为，感觉知觉是超越感觉器官中物理过程的东西。当我们看到红苹果时，我们的眼睛可能会发生一些变化，但看到红苹果并不等于它。我们会看到，一些卡拉姆学者认为，感觉知觉类似于意识到或意识到知觉的对象，因此与感觉器官中的物理过程不同。一组人甚至会接受感官知觉甚至不依赖于身体中的任何物理过程。另一派会接受感官知觉以各种物理条件的获得为前提，但仍然认为感官知觉与这些条件的发生不同。我认为，这些非还原性的感觉知觉理论是阿拉伯伊斯兰哲学家从公元十一世纪开始一直拒绝亚里士多德-阿维森主义的知觉理论的原因。