Purpose

This paper analyzes the advance selling and pricing strategies of fresh products supply chain where the e-retailer provides wholesale contract or agency contract to the fresh products supplier.

Design/methodology/approach

This paper constructed a two-period sequential-move game of fresh products supply chain members.

Findings

This analysis showed that the supply chain members had different preferences for contracts under different market conditions. The advance selling of fresh products was not a decision of the seller, but also required the support of other supply chain members. And the advance selling strategy was not always beneficial to all supply chain parties. Under the two contracts, there were market conditions in which the profits of supply chain members were Pareto-improved through the implementation of advance selling.

Research limitations/implications

The model presented in this study focuses solely on the context of monopoly, overlooking the competition from alternative suppliers or retailers. Consequently, exploring the competitive landscape within the fresh products supply chain, particularly in relation to pre-sale pricing, emerges as a crucial avenue for further investigation. By employing empirical research methods, valuable insights are gleaned, thereby significantly augmenting the existing body of relevant theories.

Practical implications

The decision to pre-sell fresh products should be based on market conditions. Supply chain members can control production costs and fresh products circulation losses to maximize profits.

Originality/value

From the perspective of game theory, this study analyzed the optimal advance selling and pricing strategies of fresh products supply chain members under two kinds of contracts. These results can provide practical implications for fresh products suppliers and e-retailers.

中文翻译：

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推进两份合同生鲜销售策略

目的

本文分析了电商向生鲜供应商提供批发合同或代理合同的生鲜供应链预售和定价策略。

设计/方法论/途径

本文构建了生鲜产品供应链成员的两阶段序贯移动博弈。

发现

分析表明，供应链成员在不同的市场条件下对合同的偏好不同。生鲜产品的预售并不是卖家的决定，还需要其他供应链成员的支持。而且预售策略并不总是对所有供应链各方有利。两份合同均存在供应链成员利润通过实施预售实现帕累托改进的市场条件。

研究局限性/影响

本研究中提出的模型仅关注垄断背景，忽略了来自替代供应商或零售商的竞争。因此，探索生鲜产品供应链中的竞争格局，特别是与预售定价相关的竞争格局，成为进一步调查的重要途径。通过采用实证研究方法，可以收集到有价值的见解，从而显着丰富现有的相关理论。

实际影响

预售生鲜产品应根据市场情况决定。供应链成员可以控制生产成本和生鲜产品流通损失，实现利润最大化。

原创性/价值

本研究从博弈论的角度分析了两种合同下生鲜供应链成员的最优预售和定价策略。这些结果可以为生鲜产品供应商和电子零售商提供实际意义。