This article deals with the integration of industry-level markup targets into oligopoly theory. It proposes a behavioral competition model in which firms use the average cost-plus price to determine their supplies. Specifically, firms are assumed to increase (resp., decrease) their supplies as the market price rises over (resp., falls below) this reference price. The equilibrium market outcome lies between those corresponding to Bertrand and Cournot competition. It depends on the industry's margin target, which determines the slope of firms' supply functions. The more significant the markup target is, the lower are the firms' equilibrium supplies at any price level and the higher is the equilibrium market price. An industry-wide commitment to targeting a markup thus reduces competition in equilibrium. The reduction in competition is more pronounced than when firms commit to linear supply functions.

中文翻译：

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在供给函数竞争模型中认真对待企业的利润目标

本文讨论将行业级加价目标纳入寡​​头垄断理论。它提出了一种行为竞争模型，在该模型中，企业使用平均成本加成价格来确定其供应量。具体来说，当市场价格上涨（或低于）该参考价格时，假设企业增加（或减少）其供应。均衡市场结果介于伯特兰竞争和古诺竞争对应的结果之间。它取决于行业的利润目标，它决定了企业供给函数的斜率。加价目标越重要，任何价格水平下企业的均衡供给量就越低，均衡市场价格就越高。因此，全行业对加价目标的承诺减少了均衡竞争。竞争的减少比企业致力于线性供给函数时更加明显。