It is well known that if the final goods producers adopt new technologies, the input suppliers with market power can extract more rent from the final goods producers by increasing the input prices. Higher rent extraction by the input supplier neither allows the licenser of the new technology to earn large profit nor helps welfare to increase much. In a model with an outside innovator (the licenser), a final good producer (the licensee) and an input supplier, we offer a new perspective to the literature by considering a licensing option, which is often observed in the business world, but ignored in the literature. We show that the licensing option offered by the outside innovator can prevent rent extraction by the input supplier. The innovator's profit and social welfare are higher under licensing option compared to a standard licensing contract with no option.

中文翻译：

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减少投入供应商提取租金的许可选项

众所周知，如果最终产品生产者采用新技术，拥有市场力量的投入品供应商就可以通过提高投入品价格从最终产品生产者那里榨取更多租金。投入供应商收取更高的租金既不能让新技术的许可者获得巨额利润，也不能帮助福利大幅增加。在具有外部创新者（许可人）、最终产品生产者（被许可人）和投入供应商的模型中，我们通过考虑许可选项为文献提供了新的视角，这在商业世界中经常观察到，但被忽视在文献中。我们表明，外部创新者提供的许可选项可以防止投入供应商提取租金。与没有选择权的标准许可合同相比，在许可选择权下创新者的利润和社会福利更高。