This study examines the optimal pricing and disclosure strategies of sellers who possess private quality information. We consider two market structures, namely, monopoly market and duopoly market; under each market structure, we further consider two characteristics of consumer preferences for the same product: homogeneity and heterogeneity. How competition and whether consumers are heterogeneous affects sellers' disclosure strategies, and profitability is the focus of our attention. Interestingly, we show that the monopolistic seller's profit is likely to increase as the disclosure cost, which is not possible in a competitive environment. We indicate that when consumers are homogeneous, sellers can obtain higher returns and are more likely to engage in quality disclosure. Finally, we show that when the market is filled with homogeneous consumers, competition always increases the motivation for sellers to engage in quality disclosure. However, when the market is filled with heterogeneous consumers, competition actually hinders sellers from engaging in quality disclosure when the cost of disclosure is low. Our results help company managers in making better disclosure and pricing strategies.

中文翻译：

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消费者同质异质竞争环境下的质量披露策略

本研究探讨了拥有私人质量信息的卖家的最优定价和披露策略。我们考虑两种市场结构，即垄断市场和双寡头市场；在每种市场结构下，我们进一步考虑消费者对同一产品的偏好的两个特征：同质性和异质性。竞争和消费者是否异质如何影响卖家的披露策略和盈利能力是我们关注的焦点。有趣的是，我们表明垄断卖方的利润可能会随着披露成本的增加而增加，这在竞争环境中是不可能的。我们表明，当消费者同质化时，卖家可以获得更高的回报，并且更有可能进行质量披露。最后，我们表明，当市场充满同质消费者时，竞争总是会增加卖家进行质量披露的动机。然而，当市场充满异质消费者时，竞争实际上会阻碍卖家在披露成本较低的情况下进行质量披露。我们的结果帮助公司管理者制定更好的披露和定价策略。