This work develops a Cournot game model to study two competing supply chains, each consisting of one manufacturer and one supplier, producing and selling substitutable green products. The manufacturers decide whether to adopt the green supplier integration (GSI) strategy and the green supplier development (GSD) investment level to improve the product greenness degree. The interaction between the GSD decisions and the GSI strategies are analyzed with different manufacturer GSD capacities and market greenness sensitivity. The results indicate that the manufacturer with a higher GSD capacity will always adopt the GSI strategy to maximize GSD investment level or profit, and the manufacturer with a lower GSD capacity decides whether to adopt the GSI strategy by comparing the GSD capacities of the two manufacturers. The game model is extended from dedicated sourcing to diversified sourcing and hybrid sourcing to obtain optimal sourcing options jointly reached by the two manufacturers. Under these extensions, the GSI strategy always leads to higher GSD investment levels, and adopting the GSI strategies by both manufacturers becomes the only Nash equilibrium strategy combination. Manufacturers choose different sourcing options by judging the difference in their GSD capacities under different criteria, and choose hybrid sourcing when their GSD capacity gap is sufficiently large in a weakly competitive market.

中文翻译：

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竞争供应链中绿色供应商整合和发展的影响

这项工作开发了一个古诺博弈模型来研究两个竞争的供应链，每个供应链由一个制造商和一个供应商组成，生产和销售可替代的绿色产品。制造商决定是否采用绿色供应商整合（GSI）策略和绿色供应商发展（GSD）投资水平，以提高产品的绿色程度。根据不同制造商的 GSD 能力和市场绿色敏感性，分析了 GSD 决策和 GSI 策略之间的相互作用。结果表明，GSD产能较高的制造商总是会采用GSI策略来最大化GSD投资水平或利润，而GSD产能较低的制造商通过比较两个制造商的GSD产能来决定是否采用GSI策略。博弈模型从专用采购扩展到多元化采购和混合采购，以获得两个制造商共同达成的最优采购选择。在这些扩展下，GSI策略总是会导致更高的GSD投资水平，并且两家制造商均采用GSI策略成为唯一的纳什均衡策略组合。制造商通过判断不同标准下GSD产能的差异来选择不同的采购方案，并在竞争较弱的市场中当GSD产能差距足够大时选择混合采购。