This article explores information aggregation and strategic communication in settings where committee members are held accountable, formally or informally, for their individual voting decisions. We show that if decisions are made via majority voting, expressive payoffs introduce a free-rider problem that prevents the committee from communicating truthfully and taking optimal decisions. In contrast, if decisions are made by unanimity, free-riding is mitigated because all agents are responsible for the committee's decision. In a controlled laboratory experiment, we find that under unanimity subjects are more truthful and are ultimately more likely to take the optimal decision.

中文翻译：

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委员会中的战略沟通具有明显的回报

本文探讨了委员会成员对其个人投票决定正式或非正式负责的情况下的信息聚合和战略沟通。我们表明，如果决策是通过多数投票做出的，表达性回报会带来搭便车问题，阻碍委员会进行真实沟通并做出最佳决策。相反，如果决定是一致做出的，那么搭便车的情况就会减少，因为所有代理人都对委员会的决定负责。在受控实验室实验中，我们发现，在一致同意的情况下，受试者会更加诚实，最终更有可能做出最佳决定。