Existing research on lobbying has predominantly focused on its material returns, such as equity returns, stock prices, and government contracts while overlooking its informational impact. This paper addresses this gap by investigating to what extent and under what conditions policymakers assimilate information delivered through corporate lobbying. Drawing on an informational perspective, it proposes that the informational effect of lobbying is moderated by the information asymmetry between policymakers and firms. Focusing on the U.S. ride-hailing industry, this study utilizes a unique dataset on U.S. state legislatures’ adoption of the model policy lobbied by ride-hailing companies. The results reveal that the informational impact of corporate lobbying is highly contingent upon the presence of information asymmetry between policymakers and firms, which can be attributed to policymakers’ resources for independent information gathering, information deliberation through public hearings or media discussions, and countervailing lobbying efforts.

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信息游说、信息不对称以及美国各州对网约车模式政策的采用

现有的游说研究主要关注其物质回报，如股权回报、股票价格和政府合同，而忽视了其信息影响。本文通过调查政策制定者在多大程度上以及在什么条件下吸收通过企业游说提供的信息来解决这一差距。从信息的角度来看，它提出游说的信息效应受到政策制定者和企业之间信息不对称的调节。这项研究以美国网约车行业为重点，利用了美国各州立法机构采用网约车公司游说的模型政策的独特数据集。结果表明，企业游说的信息影响在很大程度上取决于政策制定者和企业之间是否存在信息不对称，这可归因于政策制定者用于独立信息收集、通过公开听证会或媒体讨论进行信息审议以及反补贴游说努力的资源。