In March 2023, Credit Suisse (CS) was bailed out based on the implementation of emergency law to the exclusion of all shareholder rights of the involved banks, likely violating basic principles of monetary order. However, this paved the way for a support plan amounting to 209 billion Swiss francs and the implementation of a state-orchestrated emergency merger with UBS. By the end of August 2023, UBS had fully paid back the support plan and reported the biggest-ever quarterly profit for a bank, amounting to 29 billion US dollars. UBS also started to absorb CS’s domestic business, thereby abandoning the branding of an institution with a history of 167 years. Popular accounts claim the plan could be considered a success and that there was no cost because the money was repaid. We critically evaluate the CS bailout, shedding light on key issues such as bailout-induced wealth transfers, the “too-big-to-fail” challenge, the likelihood of bank bailouts, the optimal level of bank equity, the doctrinal separation of solvency and liquidity, and the benefits of ex-ante market-based bank fragility indicstors rather than ex-post accounting indicators. We infer a financial economist’s perspective, in which supervision is expanded by ex-ante market-based risk indicators, unweighted capital ratios are increased to adequately reflect large bank risks, and ex-ante paid liquidity options are introduced. Finally, we call for a public debate on the willingness of taxpayers to implicitly finance the too-big-to-fail risk of large banks.

2023年3月，瑞士信贷（CS）因实施紧急法而获得救助，该法排除了相关银行的所有股东权利，这可能违反了货币秩序的基本原则。然而，这为金额达2090亿瑞士法郎的支持计划以及实施国家策划的与瑞银的紧急合并铺平了道路。截至2023年8月底，瑞银已全额偿还支持计划，并公布了银行有史以来最大的季度利润，达290亿美元。瑞银也开始吸收CS的国内业务，从而放弃了一个拥有167年历史的机构的品牌。流行的说法称该计划可以被认为是成功的，并且没有任何成本，因为钱已经偿还了。我们批判性地评估CS救助，阐明救助引起的财富转移、“太大而不能倒”的挑战、银行救助的可能性、银行股本的最佳水平、偿付能力的原则分离等关键问题和流动性，以及事前基于市场的银行脆弱性指标而不是事后会计指标的好处。我们以金融经济学家的视角进行推断，通过事前基于市场的风险指标来扩大监管，提高未加权资本比率以充分反映银行的大风险，并引入事前付费流动性选择。最后，我们呼吁就纳税人是否愿意为大型银行“大而不能倒”的风险隐性融资的意愿进行公开辩论。