In their descriptions of the life dynamics of tendencies as “blind but oriented,” both Scheler and Husserl outline an alternative model of intentionality to Brentano’s conception of mental reference to determinate objects or meanings. In my reading, their phenomenological consideration of tendential structures will reveal tendency as an essential moment of intentionality. A horizon of indeterminacy turns out to be constitutive of every intentional act as a tendency toward or away from something. This paper develops as follows: First, I will present Max Scheler’s nuanced differentiation of tendential life and the systematic horizon of his model of blind but oriented tendency, which seeks to offer an alternative to the mechanism/teleology dichotomy. Second, I will present Jocelyn Benoist’s framing of the same question in the opposition between blind drives and consciousness. Benoist’s radical critique of the interpretation of intentionality as a tendency condenses in his clear assertion that drives cannot be intentional because they are constitutively blind. Benoist accuses Edmund Husserl of nothing less than murdering intentionality through phenomenological vivisection, i.e., by extinguishing in reflection the tension inherent in conative intention and watering down the concept of intentionality to such an extent that it also includes cognitive acts. I will therefore turn my attention to the alleged culprit. I will show that Husserl’s broad concept of intentionality is not only negatively justified by the possibility of transforming tendencies into a consciousness of their implicit object, but rather positively justified by the directed dynamics of both passive and active forms of intentionality. In the conclusion I will show how Husserl’s constitutive analyses move along lines akin to Scheler’s insights and call for a revision of overly static interpretations of the phenomenological concepts of intentionality and teleology.

在将倾向的生命动态描述为“盲目但有导向”时，舍勒和胡塞尔都概述了布伦塔诺对确定对象或意义的心理参考概念的另一种意向性模型。在我的阅读中，他们对倾向结构的现象学思考将揭示倾向是意向性的一个重要时刻。事实证明，不确定性的视域是每一个有意行为的组成部分，即朝向或远离某物的倾向。本文的发展如下：首先，我将介绍马克斯·舍勒对倾向性生活的细致入微的区分，以及他的盲目但有导向的倾向模型的系统视野，该模型试图为机制/目的论二分法提供一种替代方案。其次，我将介绍乔斯林·拜诺伊斯特在盲目驱力与意识之间的对立中对同一问题的框架。贝诺伊斯特对将意向性解释为一种倾向的激进批评浓缩在他明确的断言中，即驱力不可能是意向的，因为它们本质上是盲目的。贝诺伊斯特指责埃德蒙德·胡塞尔通过现象学活体解剖谋杀了意向性，即通过反思消除意动意向所固有的张力，并将意向性概念淡化到将认知行为也包括在内的程度。因此，我将把注意力转向涉嫌的罪魁祸首。我将证明，胡塞尔的广义意向性概念不仅通过将倾向转化为其隐含对象的意识的可能性来消极地证明，而且通过意向性的被动和主动形式的定向动力来积极地证明。在结论中，我将展示胡塞尔的本构分析如何沿着类似于舍勒的见解的路线进行，并呼吁修正对意向性和目的论的现象学概念的过度静态的解释。