Within the field of virtue and vice epistemology open-mindedness is usually considered an archetypal virtue. Nevertheless, there is ongoing disagreement over how exactly it should be defined. In this paper I propose a novel definition of open-mindedness as a process of impartial belief revision and use it to argue that we should shift our normative assessments away from the trait itself to the context in which it is exercised. My definition works by three sequential stages: not screening new claims, impartially weighing the evidential strength of claims, and updating beliefs accordingly. Using this definition I argue for a focus on agents’ particular circumstances to determine what degrees of credulity, open-, or closed-mindedness are appropriate in any given situation. As well as providing conceptual clarity regarding the concept of open-mindedness this paper indicates the benefits of this contextual approach for our everyday epistemic attitudes. In particular it enables us to recognise, without stigma, when ourselves or others deviate from open-mindedness for appropriate reasons.

在美德和罪恶认识论领域，开放思想通常被认为是一种典型的美德。然而，对于如何准确定义它仍然存在分歧。在本文中，我提出了开放思想的新颖定义，将其视为公正信念修正的过程，并用它来论证我们应该将规范性评估从特质本身转移到其行使的背景。我的定义分为三个连续的阶段：不筛选新的主张，公正地权衡主张的证据强度，并相应地更新信念。使用这个定义，我主张关注代理人的特定情况，以确定在任何给定情况下适当的轻信程度、开放性或封闭性。除了提供有关开放思想概念的概念清晰度之外，本文还指出了这种情境方法对我们日常认知态度的好处。特别是，当我们自己或他人出于适当的原因偏离开放思想时，它使我们能够不带任何耻辱地认识到。